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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set out in Appellants' brief does 
not clearly set forth the issues in this case but appears 
to add more confusion to a mining case which appeared 
at first to be rather involved and complicated but which 
actually has turned into a simple one. Admittedly the 
various pleadings, amended pleadings, conflicting proof of 
mining claims, a fairly large transcript of the testimony~ 
all presented to a jury, when the case could have been 
tried much more expeditiously before the court without 
a jury, lend credence to the impression that this is a 
com plica ted case. 
With the dismissal of the Respondents' Cross Appeal, 
we are actually concerned only with conflicts in three 
claims of the appellants with three claims of the re-
spondents: 
(1) The appellants' Red Robin "A" and respondents' 
Red Hill No.1: Here the appellants' Red Robin "A" was 
the prior location and since the location is not attack-
ed, .our only concern is whether the appellants did the 
required annual labor for the year ending July 1 in 
which respondents subsequently located. The Jury has 
found that the appellants did not do this work. 
(2) The appellants' Red Robin mining claim and re-
spondents' Cinder Crater No. 13: The respondents' Cin-
der Crater No. 13 was located first and since the loca-
tion is not assailed, we are only concerned with wheth-
the respondents did the required annual labor for the 
year ending July 1 in which the appellants located. 
The Jury has found that the work was done. 
(3) The appellants' Drake No. 1 and 8, which con-
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flict with the respondents' Cinder Crater No. 14: The 
respondents' Cinder Crater No. 14 was located first 
and since the location is not attacked, except insofar 
as it is claimed the ground was not open for location 
at the time Cinder Crater No. 14 was located, we are 
only concerned with whether the respondents did the 
required annual labor for the year ending July 1 in 
which appellants subsequently located. The Jury has 
found that the work was done. 
Therefore, in all three conflicts, the respondents 
prevailed in the court below. 
The only other pertine·nt facts have to do with the 
conflict between appellants' Drake No. 1 and 8 with res-
pondents' Cinter Crater No. 14 mentioned above, and 
since the respondents' Cinder Crater No. 14 was the prior 
location, the appellants attempted to show that at the 
time the respondents located this claim on July 28, 1947, 
there was at that time a valid, subsisting location on 
generally the same ground and, therefore, it was not open 
to respondents' location. The appellants' pleadings, the 
pre-trial order and the evidence show that other par-
ties, not parties in this action, had approximately ten 
years previous to respO'ndents' location on the Nlf2SE~ 
of Section 23, Township 21 South, Range 6 West, S. L. 
B. & M. located Black Dragon No. 6. However, for the 
year ending July 1, 1947, the owners of the old prior 
claim, the Black Drago·n No. 6, had not done annual 
labor or filed any Notice of Intent to Hold a-nd had not 
done so for a number of years prior. Therefore, the Black 
Dragon No. 6 had forfeited and the ground was then 
open for respondents' Cinder Crater No. 14 location. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The following points are relied upon by the respond~ 
ents to meet the claims of the appellants: 
1. THE JURY'S FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENTS HAD 
DONE THE REQUIRED ANNUAL LABOR ON CIN~ 
DER CRATER NO. 13 AND 14 AND THAT THE AP~ 
PELLANTS HAD NOT DONE THE REQUffiED 
AMOUNT OF ANNUAL LABOR FOR THEIR RED 
ROBIN "A" WAS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE AND THE JURY'S FINDINGS WILL NOT 
BE DISTURBED. 
2. IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO 
REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE MAP OF APPELLANTS' 
WITNESS A. R. SHELTON AS IT WAS ONLY A PIC~ 
TURE SUMMARY OF HIS TESTIMONY AND IT 
WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPROPER FOR THE JURY 
TO HAVE THIS MAP IN ADDITION TO THE TES~ 
TIMONY. 
3. REFUSAL BY LOWER COURT OF APPELLANTS' 
MOTION TO ALLOW JURY TO VISIT PREMISES 
IS PURELY DISCRETIONARY AND IN THE AB~ 
SENCE OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION, WILL NOT 
BE DISTURBED. 
4. REFUSAL BY THE LOWER COURT OF APPEL~ 
LANTS' MOTION TO AMEND PLEADINGS AND 
THE PRE~TRIAL ORDER AFTER THE TRIAL HAD 
COMMENCED WAS DISCRETIONARY AND 
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL. 
5. FEDERAL STATUTES OR RESOLUTIONS DISPENS~ 
lNG WITH REQUIREMENT OF ANNUAL LABOR 
AND ALLOWING NOTICE OF INTENT TO HOLD 
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IN LIEU THEREOF REQUIRE THE ACTUAL FIL-
ING OF THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO HOLD 
OR THE CLAIM WILL FORFEIT. 
6. A RE-LOCATION OF A MINING CLAIM BY A PAR-
TY AFTER SUIT HAS BEEN COMMENCED BUT 
BEFORE TRIAL, IS GOOD PROVIDING APPROP-
RIATE PLEADINGS ARE FILED. 
7. APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT IT WAS ER-
ROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO INJECT INTO 
THE CONTROVERSY THE OWNERSHIP OF APPEL-
ANTS' DRAKE NO 3 CLAIM IS WITHOUT MERIT 
AS THE LOWER COURT AWARDED THIS CLAIM 
TO THE APPELLANTS AND THIS MATTER IS NOT 
BEFORE THE COURT 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
The Jury's findings that respondents had done there-
quired annual labor on Cinder Crater No. 13 and 14 
and that the appellants had not done the required 
amount of annual labor for their Red Robin "A" was 
amply supported by the evidents and will not be dis-
turbed. 
In this case the appellants were granted a jury trial 
over the objection of the respondents. The questions of 
fact were submitted to the jury by Special Interrogator-
ies. The appellants presented evidence of annual labor 
performed on their Red Robin "A" claim and this evi-
dence is found at pages 11, 214, 215, 218 and 349 of the 
Transcript. This was disputed by the respondent and 
Special Interrogatory No. 2 (Tr. 365) was submitted to 
the jury to find if the required annual labor was actual-
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ly performed. The jury found unanimously that it had 
not been performed. The appellants' contention appears 
to be that the Court should have ruled as matter of law 
that the annual labor had been performed but it is sub-
mitted this is indeed a novel contention in view of the 
fact there was evidence submitted and it was a question 
of fact upon which the jury should find. 
Although the findings of the jury would give to appel-
lants most of their Red Robin Claim, actually the only 
conflict involving this claim was in a very small area in 
the northwest corner of respondents' Cinder Crater No.13 
claim. As the Cinder Crater No. 13 was located prior, the 
jury heard ample evidence as to the respondents' annual 
labor for this claim for the year ending July 1, 1949 con-
sisting of removing of overburden and the construction 
of a road to the claim (Tr. 222-227). Special interrogatory 
No. 5 (Tr. 366) was submitted to the jury and it found 
that the respO'ndents had performed the required annual 
labor. The testimony of the respondents was detailed 
and complete as to the dates, type of equipment used 
and the amount and value of the work and it is .t:ubmit-
ted that the findings of the jury should not be disturbed. 
The remaining co·nflict was between the appellants' 
Drake No. 1 and 8 claims which covered generally the 
same ground as respondents' Cinder Crater No. 14. Here 
again (Tr. 229-237) the respondents supplied detailed 
evidence as to the work for the year in question, show-
ing the amount and value of the work done in the re-
moving of over-burden preparatory to mining and the 
building of roads. The appellants disputed this and sub-
mitted evidence and photographs trying to prove the re-
spondents had not done the work. Again this very ques-
tion was submitted to the jury by Special Interrogatory 
No. 6 (Tr. 366), and again the jury found that the work 
was done. 
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As to whether annual labor has been performed for 
any given year by a locator is always a question of fact. 
It is common knowledge that this testimony is almost 
always in conflict and after wild claims are made by the 
conflicting parties. a jury must weigh the testimony and 
arrive at some finding. It is on such factual questions as 
this that the wisdom of submitting the special issues by 
special interrogatories is clearly evident. The court, by 
clearing away the chaff, makes it possible for the jury 
to make a clear cut decision and one which should not 
be disturbed if there was evidence to support the finding 
as was the case here. 
Point 2 
It was not error for the lower court to refuse to ac-
cept the map of the appellants' witness, engineer A. R. 
Shelton, as it was only a summary of his testimony 
and it would have been improper for the jury to have 
had this map in addition to the testimony. 
The appellants are raising strenuous objections to the 
lower court's refusal to accept a map prepared by appel-
lants' witness, engineer A. R. Shelton. Engineer Shelton 
had surveyed all the claims in question preparatory to be-
coming a witness. He testified at great length (Tr. 22-66). 
He testified as to what he had done and seen on these 
conflicting claims. Most of the testimony was relevant 
and competent. At the conclusions of his testimony, ap-
pellant offered a map made by Mr. Shelton which map 
as stated in appellants' brief recited "upon which he drew 
the results of his work and examination of the claims at 
the time the survey was made and recorded the monu-
ments observed in his thorough examination of plain-
tiffs' claims." The court refused to receive as evidence 
this map until a further study of the map by counsel 
could be made, with the court's suggestion (Tr. 33-34) 
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that counsel discuss the admissability of the map. The 
record is silent as to any further offer of the map, but 
even so, it would have been clearly incompetent as it was 
only a favorable resume or re-capitulation of Engineer 
Shelton's testimony and which, under our rules of pro-
cedure, the jury could have taken to the jury room and 
studied and used. But for a jury to hear the testimony 
a·nd then be able to take with them a picture of the tes-
timony so as to refresh their memories, would have been 
highly improper. Rule 47 {m) of our Rules of Procedure 
states what can be taken to the jury room and expressly 
states that notes taken by a juror can be taken but 
"none taken by any other person." It is submitted, the 
map was only Shelton's notes. Furthermore, even as-
suming this type of evidence had not been incompetent, 
the appellants surely have no room to complain because 
the jury heard the testimony given by the witness, all 
of which was the same as that on the map and a refusal 
of the map as an exhibit would not have been prejudic-
ial. 
Point 3 
Refusal by Lower Court of Appellants' motion to allow 
jury to visit premises is purely discretionary and in 
the absence of abuse of discretion, will not be dis-
turbed. 
The appellants requested that the jury be allowed to 
make an inspection of the claims in question. The request 
was denied on the ground that the evidence showed that 
there were many diggings and workings and roads 
throughout the entire area and the court was afraid the 
jury would be more confused than ever after the inspec-
tion. 
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A request for a jury inspection is always addressed to 
the sound discretion of the court a:nd this rule is so ele-
mentary there need be no citations of authorities. But in 
any event, if this court desires to inquire into the ques-
tion of whether there was an abuse of discretion, it only 
has to look at the testimony of one Culbert Robinson, 
witness for appellants, (Tr. 309-328). Robinson was taken 
to the premises during the course of the trial purely for 
the purpose of qualifying him as a witness. But his testi-
mony was the most confusing of any testimony at the 
entire trial. There is no reason to believe that the jurors 
themselves would have been any less confused. 
Point 4 
Refusal of lower court of appellants' motion to amend 
pleadings and the pre-trial order after trial had com-
menced was discretionary and should not be disturb-
ed on appeal. 
Again we have a matter for the court's discretion. As 
shown in the statement of facts there is a conflict be-
tween appellants' Drake No. 1 and 8 and respondents' 
Cinder Crater No. 14. The respondents' location was on 
July 28, 1947, several years prior to the Drake locations. 
Therefore, the appellants, in order to defeat the respond-
ents' location set up that an old claim, known as the 
Black Dragon No.6, covered generally the same ground. 
This old claim had been located approximately ten years 
prior to respondents' Cinder Crater No. 14 and the claim 
is that this Black Dragon was a valid subsisting claim on 
July 28, 1947 so as to defeat the respondents' location of 
their Cinder Crater 14. It is admitted that the general 
rule of law is that if there is a valid, subsisting claim 
on mining ground when a subsequent locator attempts 
to locate, the subsequent locator gets nothing by his lo-
cation. Several pre-trials were held in this case and also 
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a number of hearings on preliminary matters. The appel-
lants' complaint was also amended so as to set up this 
old Black Dragon No. 6 claim. In all the hearings, the 
pre-trials and pleadings, the appellants were relying 
upon the old Black Dragon No. 6, located by people not 
concerned with this controversy, to defeat the respond-
ents' Cinder Crater No. 14 location. 
The evidence shows that when the locators of the 
Black Dragon No. 6 located this claim on October 28, 
1937, they also located on the same day Black Dragon 
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. An amended location notice on the 
Black Dragon No. 6 was recorded June 28, 1939 which 
tied this claim to government survey corners and gov-
ernment subdivisions as the first location had not done. 
Thereafter, the locators did annual labor or filed Notices 
of Intent to hold all of the Black Dragon claims up to 
and including July 1, 1942. This is all shown in an ab-
stract of title to the Black Dragon claims, Defendants' 
exhibit No. 58. This abstract shows that the locators of 
the Black Dragon claims sold Black Dragon Nos. 1, 2, 
3, 4 and 5 to a purchaser in 1942. Thereafter Notices of 
Intent to hold were filed by the new owner for all the 
years thereafter including July 1, 1947, but only on the 
claims purchased, or Black Dragon Nos. 1, 2. 3, 4 and 5. 
But Black Dragon No. 6 was the claim in conflict with 
respondents' Cinder Crater No. 14 and yet since no an-
nual labor was performed or Notice of Intent to Hold in 
lieu thereof was recorded, this claim forfeited. 
Appare·ntly the appellants did not know until shortly 
before trial that the Black Dragon No. 6 upon which they 
had relied in order to defeat respondents' Cinder Crater 
No. 14 had lapsed for failure to do annual labor or in-
clude it in the Notices of Intention to Hold. The record 
shows (Tr. 144) that one day before the trial commenced, 
that counsel for respondent was informed that the appel-
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lants claimed that Black Dragon No.5 and 6 were actual-
ly one and the same claims and claimed the same ground. 
But respondents had prepared their entire case for trial 
on the theory that Black Dragon No. 6 had lapsed and 
would be of no concern. A claim that Black Dragon No. 
5 and 6 were one and the same claim completely changed 
the entire case because Black Dragon No. 5 was still 
good at the time respondents located their Cinder Crater 
No. 14. It would have been highly prejudicial to have to 
meet the validity of Black Dragon No.5 after reliance on 
appellants' pleadings, the preliminary hearings and the 
pre-trial order, particularly in view of the fact that the 
appella·nts had had more than ample opportunity to 
amend so as to make Black Dragon No. 5 an issue. Ob-
jection was made to amending the complaint and the 
pre-trial order so as to bring Black Dragon No. 5 in is-
sue, (Tr. 144). The jury was then excused and the court 
examined quite fully, the appellant relying upon the 
Black Dragon claims (Tr. 136-140). The court thereupon 
ruled that it would be inequitable and prejudicial for 
respondents to have to meet the validity of Black Dragon 
No.5 and denied the motion to amend the complaint and 
pre-trial order. 
It is the ge·neral rule of law followed by this court in 
many cases that such an amendment would be prejudi-
cial to the adverse party and should not be allowed. See 
Utah cases, Johnson vs. Continental Casualty Co., 300 
P. 1032, Johnson vs. Brinkerhoff, 57 Pac. 2d 1132, Benson 
vs. Oregon Short Line, 99 Pac. 1072, Newton vs. Tracy 
Loan & Trust Co. 40 Pac. 2d 204. Also that since it is 
within the sound discretion of the court, it is not an 
abuse of discretion whe·n refused at or just before the 
trial. 
Point 5 
Federal statutes or resolutions dispensing with re-
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quirement of annual labor and allowing notice of in-
tent to hold in lieu thereof require the actual filing 
of the notice of intention to hold or the claim will 
forfeit. 
The appellants' contentions at Point VI of their brief 
that it is not necessary for an owner of a mining claim 
to actually comply with the law in order to hold the 
claim is entirely without merit. It is submitted that when 
the federal laws or resolutions of Congress provide in un-
ambiguous terms what must be done, they mean exactly 
what they say. 
The Federal government at numerous times has re-
lieved a locator of a mining claim from doing annual 
labor. Congress did this back in the 1893 "Depression" 
and again in 1917 and 1918 during World War I. Also dur-
ing the "Depression" of the nineteen thirties and again 
during World War II from 1943 to 1949. In each instance 
because of some national emergency, annual labor was 
dispensed with. But i'n each instance Congress has re-
quired that in lieu of annual labor, the locator shall file 
in the County where the claim is located, a Notice of In-
tention to Hold. The reason for this is obvious as the lo-
cator must show good faith in his intentions to hold and 
he must do somethi'ng to give notice to the world that he 
has not abandoned his claim. The provision suspending 
annual labor which applies to this case was a resolution 
adopted by Congress May 3, 1943 and designated as H.R. 
2370. It provided that the requirements of $100.00 worth 
of labor per claim "is hereby suspended as to all mining 
claims in the United States, including the Territory of 
Alaska until the hour of 12 o'clock Meridian on the 1st 
day of July after the cessation of hostilities in the pres-
ent war as determined by proclamation of the President 
or concurrent resolution of the Congress; Provided, that 
every per·son claiming any such mining claim, in order to 
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obtain the benefits of this act, ·shall file, or cause to be 
filed, in the office where the location notice or certificate 
is recorded, on or before 12 o'clock meridian of July 1 for 
each year this act remains in effect, a notice of his de-
sire to hold said mining claim under this act." This pro-
vision was tn effect until 1949. 
In all cases found by this writer, where this question 
has been ruled upon by the courts, it has been held, with 
one exception, that the recording of a Notice of Intent to 
Hold in lieu of annual labor is mandatory in order to 
hold the claim. Some of these cases are Kramer vs. Glad-
ding, McBean & Co. 85 Pac. 2d 552 (Cal.), Pine grove 
Nevada Gold Mining Co. vs. Freeman, 171 Pac. 2d 366, 
(Nevada). There do not appear to be too many cases in-
volving these suspension statutes or resolutions and it 
is submitted that the reason for this is because the re-
quirements are so obvious that there has been on rea-
son to appeal. It most certainly would be wrong for a 
mining claimant to hold a claim indefinitely, without 
doing any work or even complying with the suspension 
requirements. He could hold a claim by having a secret 
intention, not communicated to any one, to eventually 
go back and assert ownership of the cltaim. 
The only case found by this writer and which is cited 
in appellants' brief which appears to hold the record-
ing of a Notice of Intent to Hold is not necessary is the 
case of Donoghue vs. Tonopah Oriental Mining Co. 198 
Pac. 553 (Nevada). This is a very interesting case but 
even a casual reading will clearly show it gives no help 
to the appellants. There the several owners of a group 
of claims, partly in Nye County and partly in Esmeralda 
County, Nevada attempted to file a Notice of Intent to 
Hold under the resolution of Congress for the year 1918 
which for all practical purposes is the same as that 
adopted during World War II. But the owners of the 
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claim were in doubt as to whether their claim was in 
Nye County or Esmeralda County as the County line was 
still in some doubt although surveyed a few years prev-
iously. The owners tried in every way to comply with the 
law and tried to record their notice in Nye County, but 
the County Recorder, a person upon whom they relied, 
told them it should be recorded in Esmeralda County 
where it was eventually recorded. There was no question 
about their intent and good faith but they recorded the 
notice in the wro·ng county acting in good faith and in 
bona fide compliance with the law. The Nevada Supreme 
Court stated that it was not a question of construction 
of the resolution as its meaning was clear but that it 
should not be applied under the peculiar circumstances 
of the case. With the wisdom of this decision, the Re-
spondents agree but it clearly is not controlling in this 
case. In this Nevada case the locators made an honest 
attempt to comply but in the case at bar, the owner did 
exactly nothing over a period of approximately five 
years. If the 1943 resolution of Congress has no appli-
cation to the present case, then it has no application at 
all. Furthermore, the Nevada Supreme Court, in the Pine 
Grove Case, supra, very carefully explained and disting-
uished the old Donoghue case. 
Point No.6 
A re-location of a mining claim by a party after suit has 
been commenced but before trial, is good providing 
appropriate pleadings are filed. 
The appellants raise a hue and cry that the respond-
ents located their Red Hill No. 1 claim in conflict with 
the prior location of appellants' Red Robin "A" claim. 
But here the record shows that the respondents had lo-
cated years prior to either claim, their Cinder Crater No. 
5 on the same ground. Before trial the respondents con-
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eluded their Cinder Crater No. 5 was not good but they 
also concluded that appellants' Red Robin "A" was not 
good for the reason that the annual labor had not been 
performed. Consequently respondents re-located this 
claim on September 6, 1956 under the name of Red Hill 
No. 1. The jury found that the appellants had not per-
formed their annual labor for the year ending July 1, 
1956 and therefore, the respondents' subsequent location 
was good. 
With all the claims of the parties involved in this case, 
to be tried before a jury, it would have been folly for the 
court or jury to have spent considerable time in hearing 
the evidence and then found that neither of the parties 
had a valid claim upon this ground. So long as the mat-
ter is being litigated, it was only just and sensible that 
the court and jury have proper claims before them to 
make a decision. 
Furthermore, the respondents' pleadings were amend-
ed several months before the trial so as to put the validi-
ty of the last location of Red Hill No. 1 in issue and no 
objection to this amendment was made. The appellants 
were fully apprised of the claim. Our code contemplates 
the incorporating of facts happening after suit is com-
menced as issues in the case providing proper pleadings 
are filed to bring the matter before the Court. See rule 
15(d) of our Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Point No.7 
Appellants' contention that it was error for the court 
to inject into the controversy the ownership of appel-
lants' Drake No. 3 claim is without merit as the lower 
court and jury awarded this claim to the appellants 
and this matter is ·not before the Court. 
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The appellants are attempting to raise as an issue the 
fact that the lower court allowed the conflict between 
appellants' Drake No. 3 and respondents' Black Lava No. 
1 claim, which cover the same ground, to enter the case. 
But surely the appellants have no cause to complain as 
this conflict was resolved by the court and jury in favor 
of the appellants and with the dismissal of respondents' 
Cross Appeal, there is nothing before the Court as to 
this claim. It is a situation of the appellant complaining 
about a decision entirely in their favor and nothing more 
need be said. 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize the contentions of the respondents, they 
earnestly believe that the points raised by the appellants 
have been met and refuted in each instance. The jury's 
answering of the special interrogatories submitted to 
them was amply supported by the evidence although ad-
mittedly much of it was in conflict. These findings were 
not the result of a general verdict or decision of the jury 
but were express findings upon interrogatories propound-
ed to the jury on the specific qpestions of fact and the 
court has accepted and adopted these findings. Since 
there was evidence to support them, all of the appellants' 
contentions pertaining to whether required annual labor 
on the claims was or was not performed by the parties 
has been resolved and should not be disturbed. 
The contention of the appellant that the lower court 
committed an error in refusing to allow an amendment 
to the plaintiffs' complaint and the pre-trial order, after 
the trial had progressed several days is without merit. 
Such an amendment would have changed the whole com-
plexion of the case and would have been highly inequita-
ble and prejudicial to the respondents. Also this is a mat-
ter for the sound discretion of the court and surely there 
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was no abuse of discretion under the circumstances. 
Likewise the refusal of the court to permit a jury inspec-
tion of the claims was discretionary and will not be dis-
turbed on appeal in the absence of abuse of discretion. 
The appellants' contention that even though Federal 
Statutes or resolutions of Congress suspending the re-
quirement of annual labor upon the filing of a Notice of 
Inte·ntion to Hold actually do not require this to be done 
flies directly in the face of the very Act of which appel-
lants seek to take advantage. When the Federal Act re-
lieved a locator of performing the annual labor by doing 
something as easy as merely filing a short notice, surely 
such a minimum requirement should be strictly com-
plied with. 
The appellants' other contentions that one of respond-
ents' claims was located after the commencement of the 
action has no merit as appropriate pleadings were filed, 
making this an issue in the case. And finally, for the 
appellants to complain about a matter resolved entirely 
in their favor is indeed a novel idea. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ORVILLE ISOM 
Attorney for Respondents 
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